Twenty-six years ago, Britain ground to a halt as protests at oil refineries and fuel distribution depots became a national crisis.
Petrol stations ran dry, supermarkets struggled to keep shelves stocked, hospitals cancelled appointments, businesses warned they were days from shutting down and the roads fell eerily silent.
It was a dramatic demonstration of something we usually take for granted, which is that modern economies cannot function without fuel.
Today, as Britain becomes increasingly dependent on imported diesel, we should remember that lesson.
In the early 2000s, the UK produced more than enough diesel to meet its own needs. Since then, that resilience, along with much of our refining capacity, has been steadily dismantled.
The closure of Grangemouth and Lindsey last year accelerated that decline, and today more than half of the diesel Britain needs must now come from overseas.
That matters because, despite the drive towards electrification, the country still runs on hydrocarbons. Around 15 million cars and heavy goods vehicles use diesel, including the lorries that move food and goods around the country. Emergency and military vehicles depend on it too, while diesel generators provide back-up power for critical infrastructure.
For years, our growing dependence on imports attracted little attention because global supplies were plentiful and prices relatively low. The past five years have exposed the weakness in that assumption.
Russia was once a major source of diesel for Britain and Europe, but those supplies disappeared following the invasion of Ukraine. Turmoil in the Middle East has since provided another reminder of how quickly apparently secure supplies can become vulnerable, leaving Britain increasingly reliant on diesel shipped across the Atlantic.
If America were to restrict diesel exports in response to its own domestic pressures, as has been threatened, the consequences for Britain and Europe could be profound.
We know what happens when fuel stops moving because we saw it in September 2000. But there is an important difference between then and now.
Back then, we had the fuel. The problem was getting it out of refineries and distribution terminals. Today, an increasing proportion of the fuel Britain depends on is not produced here at all.
That makes the debate over our remaining domestic energy resources all the more important.
Opponents of developments such as Rosebank argue that North Sea oil does little for British energy security because much of it will be exported. That fundamentally misunderstands how our energy system works.
Britain is part of a deeply integrated European energy market in which crude oil and refined products move between countries according to the capabilities of refineries and the needs of consumers.
North Sea crude exported to a refinery in the Netherlands or Belgium does not cease to contribute to our energy security when it leaves UK waters. It enters a European refining system that produces the diesel, petrol and aviation fuel consumed across the continent, including products imported back into Britain.
Every additional barrel produced from the North Sea is one Britain and our European neighbours do not have to source from Russia, the Middle East, the United States or elsewhere in an increasingly uncertain world. Energy security is national security, both for Britain and our European allies.
The case for domestic production goes further. It protects highly skilled jobs, supports the supply chain companies we will need to deliver the energy transition and generates billions in tax revenues that can help ease the burden of fuel duty and household energy bills. Producing more at home also means importing less, improving our balance of payments.
That is why oil projects such as Rosebank are of crucial importance. Their contribution to energy security should not be judged on whether every barrel is landed, refined and consumed within the UK. Energy markets simply do not work that way.
Ministers should see production and refining as two parts of the same strategic challenge: supporting investment in North Sea resources, protecting the refining capacity we still possess and recognising Britain's role as a major energy producer within the wider European system.
None of this means abandoning the energy transition. It means recognising that the transition must be secure as well as orderly.
Britain and Europe will continue to consume substantial quantities of oil while that transition takes place. The question is whether more of it should come from resources we control, supporting our economy and our allies, or from increasingly uncertain suppliers overseas.
The fuel blockades of 2000 showed how quickly a country can seize up when energy supply chains are interrupted. A quarter of a century later, with fewer British refineries and a more dangerous geopolitical environment, deliberately accelerating the decline of one of Europe's major sources of oil - the UK North Sea - would be a catastrophic error for Britain and Europe.
Prof John Underhill is Director for Energy Transition at the University of Aberdeen