THE Brexit debate has evinced a certain air of unreality.
In large part, this is because neither side has been willing to acknowledge the degree of uncertainty of the consequences of a vote either way.
Unusually for a referendum, the British public is not being asked to vote on a specific proposal, but rather on whether it would like to begin a process whose outcome is both uncertain and complex.
Even if the British public votes to remain within the EU, what that EU will look like in two or three years time is far from clear.
Unwilling to concede the uncertainties of the decision, both sides in the debate have asserted a false confidence in their predictions.
The “Remain” campaign has deluged the public with figures and forecasts purporting to predict what the UK economy will look like in five or even 15 years if Britain stays or leaves.
Given the appalling record of the Bank of England or the Treasury (or even the IMF) in economic forecasting even six months ahead, the use of such data is, at best, disingenuous.
The pro-Brexit campaign is no better, making assertions about the kind of deal Britain will be able to get out of the EU, or the trade agreements Britain will be able to sign with other countries, without a shred of supporting evidence.
A better starting point may be to look at the current European reality and consider what implications a Brexit vote may have.
The Brexit campaign’s image of a monolithic European state threatening British rights and freedoms is a straw man that bears little resemblance to reality.
Even the Treaty of Lisbon, whose article 50 would govern Britain’s exit from the EU, has only limited relevance to the current situation of the EU.
Far from the unified monolith of the Eurosceptics’ fears, the EU is already fragmented into at least three different regions.
To the north-west, Eurosceptic members like Sweden, the UK or Denmark resist further integration and avoid entry into the Euro.
In the east, the former members of the Warsaw Pact are resentful of their treatment and, to some extent, feel themselves abandoned by an EU obsessed with preserving the Euro.
Countries like Poland and Hungary have elected right-wing Eurosceptic governments.
Inbetween lies the Eurozone, in principle committed to further political and economic integration.
But even within the Eurozone, there are sharp divisions.
The southern members, especially Greece, but also Spain and Italy, resent the austerity policies imposed by Germany.
Even France is cautious of the further political and fiscal integration that Germany insists on as the quid quo pro for sharing the liability for sovereign debt in the Eurozone.
In addition to these three regions within the EU, there are also the Balkan countries who have not yet entered the EU (and are unlikely to do so in the near future) and who have borne much of the bulk of the migration crisis.
This deeply fragmented Europe confronts a series of existential crises.
The Euro crisis has been postponed rather than resolved.
At some point the limits of ECB President Mario Draghi’s “magic powers” will be reached and the hard decisions will need to be taken.
It is still unclear whether the Euro will survive.
The migrant crisis has eased, but will renew once it becomes clear that the EU cannot deliver on the deal with Turkey.
Not only does this threaten EU cohesion, but also the free movement of goods and people and the fragile stability of the Balkans.
The EU has still to to forge an effective common foreign and security policy.
Key European members differ significantly in their approaches to Russia, China and the Middle East.
This has also made it all but impossible to design a common energy strategy.
These weaknesses in European policy making will be thrown into sharp relief if Donald Trump is elected US president.
But even a President Clinton is likely to demand that the Europeans take on more responsibility for their own security.
Thus Europe is neither the monolithic threat portrayed by the Brexit campaign, nor is it the political and economic success implied by the Remain campaign.
A British vote to leave would not result in Britain’s immediate withdrawal from the EU.
Rather, it would begin a process of negotiation over the conditions governing Britain’s future relationship with the EU.
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty envisages these negotiations lasting two years, after which Britain would cease to be a member of the EU.
It is not clear what happens if the negotiations exceed the two-year limit (which is quite likely – in the case of the only other country to leave the EU, Greenland, far less complex and the negotiations took three years).
The EU members could agree to extend the negotiations, or they could just present the UK with a fait accompli.
The EU itself will not just sit still during this negotiation process.
A British Brexit vote would change the dynamics of EU geopolitics in a broader sense. In some countries, for example Denmark, there would be pressure for their own referendum on leaving the EU.
Even countries that do not want to leave the EU could use the negotiating process with the UK to seek their own opt-outs (e.g. over migration and border controls) and to loosen their links with Brussels.
This could lead to France and Germany taking a hard line on the negotiations with the UK to discourage any potential break-aways or loosening of EU structures.
The impact of external shocks (increased tensions with Russia, a revival of the migration crisis, trade tensions with China, handling a Trump presidency) are harder to predict.
At the very least, there will be resentment at the UK for distracting EU leaders from tackling these issues.
Political and economic tensions will mark the negotiating period in the UK as well.
National political life, especially within the Conservative Party, will be traumatised by a pro-Brexit vote, especially if it is close.
The Scottish National Party has already raised the possibility of another referendum on Scottish independence, to allow Scotland to remain in the EU.
Less has been said about the impact on the fragile peace process in Northern Ireland.
The psychological impact on the nationalist community of re-imposing borders between Northern Ireland and the Republic, which they will see as a step away from the ultimate reunification of the island, will be significant.
It is not irrelevant that the DUP, the Unionist Party most sceptical of the peace process, is the only major political party in Northern Ireland supporting Brexit.
There are already warnings of increased terrorist capabilities among Irish Republican dissidents.
A vote to leave the EU is likely to lead to increased tensions and conflict in Northern Ireland, if not to a renewal of open conflict.
A vote to remain within the EU does not avoid any of these problems, it simply changes the context.
Within the UK, the Scottish nationalists will continue to dream of independence, the peace process in Northern Ireland will remain fragile (with increasing republican dissident attacks) and the Conservative Party will still be traumatised (perhaps more so).
A fragmented EU will still have to confront crises in the Eurozone, migration, foreign policy and energy strategies.
Sharp divisions will remain over the speed and nature of further integration.
Right and left wing populism will remain a threat to traditional politics, and politicians.
With or without the UK, the EU will need to undertake radical reform to confront the challenges of the 21st century (as Commission President Juncker has acknowledged).
The difference between voting to stay or leave may not be as great as the campaigners from both sides suggest.
There are two main takeaways from this discussion, apart from the duplicitous nature of the two campaigns.
Firstly the interdependencies and interconnections between apparently unrelated issues, whereby the Brexit decision will have an impact far beyond just Britain’s membership of the EU.
Secondly, the British people are being asked to make a decision under conditions of extreme uncertainty.
These are both features of the highly complex and volatile international environment of the 21st century.
Aurora Partners specialises in mapping these interdependencies and interconnections for our clients, helping them to manage both ordinary and extraordinary needs and increase the prospect of a favourable future.
The Brexit vote, whichever way it goes, will herald a period of increased doubt and change.
Understanding this environment and developing enterprise resilience to survive its shocks and surprises will be essential.